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LENDER LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS
WASTE: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The explosion of l it igat ion and public concern over hazardous
waste and other forms of pollution brin gs into sharp focus the conflict
between environm ental policy goals and econ omic goals . 1 On the en
vironmental side, statutes such as the Comprehensive Environmental
Response,

Compensation,
the

"Superfund "), 2
("RCRA"),3

and

the

Liability

and

Resource

Act

Conservation

Federal

Water

or

("CERCLA"

and

Pollution

Recovery

Act

Control

Act

("FWP CA")4 represent an attempt to force cleanup of existin g pollu
tion and deter future polluting activities. On the econom ic side, the
concern is to preserve econom ic health by promotin g business activity
in the pr ivate sector. 5 One of the most recent and significant areas in
w hich these two polic y goals have clashed involves the imposit ion of
CERCLA liabil ity6 u pon a l ending institution that becomes involved
in the borrow er's polluting act ivity. 7
I. See, e.g., w. TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA JN THE AGE Of ENVIRON
MENTAL ISM (1982)
(asserting that environmentalism protects the vested interests of an "aristocratic
elite" and is hostile to
economic change). But see Stewart , Economics , Environmen t and th e Limits of
Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. I (1985).
2.
3.
4.

CERCLA§§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
RCRA §§ 1002-9010, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
FW PCA §§ 101-517, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 ) .

See W. TUCKER, supra n o t e l .
Although this Comment focuses o n CERCLA, similar issues may arise under RCRA § 7003,
42 U.S.C. § 69 73
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (imposing liability for release on an owner/operator of a
disposal facili ty)
or the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 132(f)(l)-(3) (19 8 6 ) (imposing liability on owners

S.
6.

or ope rato rs of
discharging facilities for the unauthorized discharge of pollutants). Similarly, state
Supc rfund stat
utes may raise the problem of lender liability. All but ten states have enacted legislation
that parallels C
ERCLA See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW§ § 2 7-1301 to -1321 (McKinney1984
& Supp. 1988);
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act;
MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 21E (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control
.

Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58:10-2 3 . 1 1 to -23.34 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). Many of these same states
have a dopted "supe
to
rlien" statutes which essentially allow the state to subordinate other liens in order
recover the
costs of cleanup. See generally Kessler v. Tarrats, 194 N.J. Super. 136, 476 A.2d 3
( 1984). The
states without CERCLA-like legislation include Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawllli,
Idah o, Iowa
, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming.

��

7. See gen erally Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on Com
merc ial Len ding
ods to av01d
and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133 (1986) (suggesting meth
environme
ntal liability); Soriano & Locket, Hazardous Waste Liability: The Emerging Problem for

Len ders, 12
av01d
Chemical Waste Litigation Rep. 47 (1986) (arguing that lenders may foreclose and
lia bility whe
Substance
Hazardous
Into
Lending
On,
t
Sell
re there is a prompt reassignment); Berz &

659
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The purpose of this Comment is four-fold. First, the CERCLA
liability scheme will be discussed to provide the necessary sta tutory
background to evaluate the efficiency of imposing liability on lenders.
Second, the decisions of United States

v.

Mirabile, 8 United States

v.

Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,9 and other cases concerning lender liabil·
ity will be discussed and analyzed.

Third, an effort will be made to

isolate the standard for imposing lender liability. Finally, the imposi
tion of lender liability will be critiqued from an economic perspective.
This economic analysis suggests that courts should impose liabil
ity on lenders only where the lender is sharing in the profits of the
manufacturer and there is a clear ..joint venture" between the lending
institution and the polluting

enterprise.

The current

CERCLA

scheme imposes liability on the polluting company with the result that
these firms will "internalize" the "external" costs of pollution. In
other words, once the legal rule forces internalization, the individual
firm's cost structure will reflect the true cost to society and the efficient
level of production will be reached through the normal competitive
process. However, imposing liability on a party who does not make
production decisions, such as the lender, imposes costs without creat
ing any offsetting benefit. Indeed, this imposition forces an inefficient
result. The joint venture standard avoids this inefficiency by restrict
ing the imposition of liability to those cases where the lender is in a
position to exercise the production decisions.
II. THE CERCLA LIABILITY SCHEME
The CERCLA legislation, as amended, was enacted in response
to the threat posed by an increasing number of hazardous waste
dumps. 10 In order to deter future pollution and foster cleanup of ex
isting sites, CERCLA imposes broad liability for releases of any haz
ardous

substance. 11

When

an

"imminent

and

substantial

Liability: The Secured Creditor as "Owner" Under Superfund, 12 Chemical
Waste Litigation Rep. 3S
( 1986) (arguing that lender may be liable for foreclosure alone); Comment,
Fear of Foreclosure: United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10165 (1986) (comparing and

reconciling the major cases); Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding
Scope of Liability for Environmental
Damage and Its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP.
L. REV. IOI (1985) (generaJ discussion of
how CERCLA liability may affect business transaction
s); Burrat, Foreclosure and United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Paying the Piper or Learning
How to Dance to a New Tune?, 11 Envtl. L.

Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10098 (1987) (arguing that the
court clouds the issue by discussing "public
policy.").
8. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
16 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20557, 911
(D. Md. 1986).

9.

10. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995.

�

11. United tates v. �ortheastern Phannaceutical
& Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 (W.D.
Mo. 1984), ajf ''d m part, rev 'din part, 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
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endangerment"12 to public health exists, the government has two op
tions. It may conduct the cleanup itself and seek reimbursement from
"responsible parties,"13 or seek to have the responsible parties under
take the remedial action.14 Potentially responsible parties may be lia
ble for all costs of removal o r remedial action, any other necessary
costs of response, and damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the costs of assessing the injury, destruc
tion or loss resulting from the release. 15

CERCLA imposes liability on three classes of actors: past16 and
present17 owners and/or operators of the facility, transporters of haz
ardous

substances, 18

and

generators

of

hazardous

substances.19

Courts generally interpret CERCLA to impose strict liability.20 In ad
dition, courts typically impose joint and several liability.21 However,
liability will be divided if there is a reasonable basis for app ortionment
of damages.22
Under CERCLA, parties responsible to the government for the
costs of cleanup cannot, by i ndemnification, "hold harmless," or simi
lar contractual clauses, avoid liability to the government.23 Neverthe
less, this provision does not invalidate any agreements to insure, hold
harmless, or indemnify a contractual party for any liability.24 Fur
thermore, CERCLA does not prevent "a cause of action that an owner
or operator or any other person subject to liability under this section,
or a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or other-·
wise against any person."25 The end result of this c onfusing analysis i s
12. CERCLA § § 104(a)(l), 106(a), 4 2 U.S.C. § § 9604(a)( l), 9606(a) (1982).

13. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9f/J7 (1982) allows the governm ent to bring suit against "poten
tially responsible parties." The term is not formally used or defined in CERCLA, but is used frequently
to denote parties who could be held liable. See 1 C.F R. § 305.84-4 (1988) (introductory paragraph).
.

14. CERCLA § J06(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).

15. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9f/J7(a) (1982).
16. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982).
17. CERCLA § 107(a)( l), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1982).

18. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982).
19. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982).

United States v.
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d.1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985);
Northeastern Phannaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ajf'd in part.
m'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Price,
20. See New York

577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D. N.J. 1983).

21. See United States v. Nort heastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45
(W.D. Mo. 1984) aff'din part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146
(1987 ); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753,

(D. s.c. 1984).
22. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States

1759-60

v.

Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
23. CERCLA § 107(eXl), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)( l) (1982).
24. Id.

25. CERCLA § 107(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982). See Wehner

v.

Syntex Agribusiness,
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that a party can not avoid liability to the government, but parties are
free to allocate responsibility among themselves.
This Comment will focus on the definition of "owners and opera
tors. "26 If a lender is to be liable under CERCLA, the court must find
that the lender is an "owner and operator." The statute defines this
potentially responsible party to i nclude any person owning or operat
ing a vessel o r an offshore facility,27 or any person who owned or oper
ated or otherwise controlled an abandoned facility immediately prior
to its abandonment. 28 Although the statute requires a party to be an
"owner

and

operator" to be liable, courts interpret the language as

imposing liability on owners

or

operators. 29

Since the purpose of CERCLA is to provide a prompt and effec
tive response to releases and potential releases of hazardous sub
stances, 30 the definition of "owners and operators" is interpreted very
broadly. As a result, any party w ho holds an interest in a hazardous
waste facility i s at risk of CERCLA liability. 31 Furthermore, the defi
nition applies to "owners" and "operators" whose actions have not
contributed to the environmental problems.

Thus, courts have im

posed liability on present owners, 32 a firm that held title for only one
hour in order to transfer the property,33 an owner/lessor of a site,34
corporate officers, 35 and bankruptcy trustees, 36 even though their ac
tions played n o role in the creation of the hazardous condition.
Given the expansion of liability, it i s not surprising that courts
have found the Superfund legislation to be applicable to lenders who
become actively involved in the polluter/borrower's activities,37 or
lenders who acquire title through foreclosure. 38 A lender generally is
Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 3 1 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Colorado v . ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484

(D.

Colo.

1985).
26. CERCLA § 107, 42 U .S.C. § 9607 (1982).
27. CERCLA § 107(aXI), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I) (1982).
28. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982).

29. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20557

(D.

Md. 1986).

30. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
31. Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 3 6-37.

32. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 7 5 9 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2167 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
,
33. United States v. Carolawn Co. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20698 (D. S.C. 1984).
34. United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20616 (D. N.M. 1984);
.
Umted States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 20
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1755,
1758 (D. s.c. 1984).
35. United States v. Car olawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20699 (D. S.C. 1984).
36. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 4 6 9 U.S. 274 (1985).
37. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
38. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 16 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20557 (D. Md.
1986).
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not liable as an "owner" or "operator" under CERCLA. The statute
expressly exempts "a person, who, without participating in the man
agement of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of the ownership primarily
to protect his security i nterest in the vessel or facility."39 The policy
rationale behind this "security interest exemption" is to encourage
credit by not saddling lenders with environmental liabilities.40 Fur
thermore, courts limit the exemption to lenders who did not partici
pate in the manageme n t of the facility.4 1 Consequently, a lender may
be exposed to massive CERCLA liability for minimal involvement in
management activities.

From the bank's perspective, the critical in

quiry is to determine when its participation becomes sufficient to make
an "owner" or "operator" under Superfund.42 This inquiry is only
partly answered by the case law interpreting CERCLA.
III. THE CASE LAW
A. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.
The first case to discuss the potential environmental liability of a
len der was Jn

re

T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. 43 Long involved a dispute

over funds held by a bankruptcy trustee. Following the filing of bank
ruptcy and the appointment of a trustee, an act of vandalism resulted
in the release of a hazardous substance. When the trustee refused to
take the necessary remedial action, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") did so itself and filed an application for reimburse
ment by the estate for the costs incurred in the cleanup. The EPA also
sought reimbursement under the Bankruptcy Code from bankruptcy
estate funds in which the BancOhio National Bank ("BancOhio") held
a perfected security interest.44
The bankruptcy court in Long held the estate liable for cleanup
39. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). It should be noted that the sec u rity
inter est exemption is still part of the definition. One of the unofficial reporting services inadvertently
omitted the language from its 1986 supplement. It should also be noted that the 1986 reauthorization

provides for an exemption for one who takes the property without know ledge of the toxic wute and
who has made the requisite "reasonable inquiry". However, since a prer equis ite for the exemption is
the absence of a duty to investigate, lenders will not be relieved of liability under this provision. Fur
ther more, the conference report specifically indicates that those engaged in a commercial t ra nsact ion

will be held to a higher standard. Thus, the protection provided to a lender under this section is
specula tive, at best. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4-S, 187 (1986).

40.

Berz Sexton, supra note 7, at 37.

41.

See

42.

Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 38 .

43.

45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 198S).

infra

notes 43-93 and acco mpanying te xt .

44. Id. at 280, 287 (under 11 U.S.C. § S06(c) (1982)). The EPA also sought recovery from the
estate under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)( l)(A) (Supp. IV 1986), arguing that the cleanup costs were an admin·
istr ative cost expende
d to preserve the estate and hence should receive top priority. Long, 45 Bankr. at
280, 282.
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costs as an administrative expense, even though the trustee had at
tempted to abandon the property.45

The court then found that

BancOhio was not responsible under CERCLA for the costs incurred
by the EPA.

The court utilized the security interest exemption46 to

find that "even if BancOhio had repossessed its collateral pursuant to
its security agreement, it would not be an 'owner or operator' under
CERCLA."47 The court relied on the fact that BancOhio had not par
ticipated in the management of the property.48
B. United States v. Mirabile
The Pennsylvania Federal District Court encountered the issue
more squarely in United States

v.

Mirabile.49 In Mirabile, the United

States sued the owners of a paint factory site to recover costs incurred
in the cleanup of hazardous wastes on the site.

The owners, the

Mirabiles,

Trust

in

tum joined

American

Bank

and

Company

("ABT") and Mellon Bank (East) National Association ("Mellon")
third party defendants.

as

Both ABT and Mellon were involved in fi

nancing the operations of the paint company, which had owned the
site at the time the hazardous condition was created. The Mirabiles
contended that certain activities taken by the banks with respect to the
paint site were sufficient to make the banks "owners" under CER
CLA. ABT and Mellon counter-claimed against the Small Business
Administration ("SBA") under a similar theory. The banks and the
SBA moved for summary judgment, arguing that their activities
should not subject them to CERCLA liability.
The court granted the motion of ABT and the SBA, but refused
to grant summary judgment to Mellon.

The opinion focused on

whether the creditors had become so "overly entangled" in the affairs
of the paint manufacturer as to become an owner. The court sought
guidance from related case law holding that an individual who owns
stock in a corporation and actively participates in its management can
be held liable for cleanup costs incurred as a result of improper dispo
sal by the corporation. 50 The court found these cases to be of limited
45.

Leng,

46.

CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XA) (1982).

45 Bankr. at 282-87.

47.

Long,

48.

The court also denied the EPA's request for an equitable lien.

45 Bankr. at 288-89.
The court stressed that

BancOhio had already suffered a loss on its loan due to the bankruptcy status of the borrower. While it
assumed the risk of that loss when it extended the loan, the court found that "[i]t would be inequitable,
however, to make BancOhio bear the risk of all damage caused by property in which it holds a security
interest." Id. at 289.
49.

15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

50.

Specifically, the court looked to New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, IOS2·S3 (2d

Cir. 1985) (imposing liability on corporate officer and stockholder) United States v. Carolawn, 14 Envtl.
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value, however, because the individual defendants' involvement was so
extreme that it was of no help in "defining the point at which partici
pation is too attenuated to permit the imposition of liability."51 The
court also noted that while there was clear congressional intent to im
pose the costs of cleanup on those responsible for the hazardous condi
tion and those who bore the fruits of the disposal,52 secured creditors
should not be considered a member of that class.53 In addition, the
opinion referred to the security interest exemption to find legislative
support for the policy argument.54
Ultimately, the court found, with respect to ABT and the SBA,
that, "[m]ere financial ability to control waste disposal practices of the
sort possessed by the secured creditors in this case is not ...sufficient
for the imposition of liability."55 Specifically, the participation must
be in the management of the hazardous waste "facility," i.e.,participa
tion in the "operational, production, or waste disposal activities."56
ABT took the property at a sheriff's sale following the paint manufac
turer's Chapter 11 bankruptcy and immediately assigned the bid to the
In the interim, ABT took such actions as securing the
building against vandalism, making inquiries concerning the costs of
hazardous waste removal,and visiting the property in order to show it
Mirabiles.

to prospective purchasers. The court found that ABT's actions "were
plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interests in the
property."57 Since ABT lacked the requisite level of participation, it
was exempted from liability by the CERCLA security interest
exemption.

The motion for summary judgment had even more merit with
respect to the SBA. Although the SBA's loan agreement with the
paint manufacturer contemplated involvement in the management of
the facility, this involvement never occurred.58 In addition, mere fi
nancial restrictions, such as those on the use of loan proceeds, were
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699, 20700 (imposing liability on corporate officer); and United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding trans
porter of wastes, chemical company, and president and vice-president of chemical company jointly and
severally liable). See Mirabile, 1 S Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995.
Sl. Mirabile, IS Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995.
52. Id. (citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985)).
53. Id. Although t he court did not explain why the argument cannot be applied with equal force
to a secured creditor, presumabl y it is because the secured creditor docs not put itself in the same
position of risk as docs one directly involved in the managemen t of the facility. Stt infra notes 114 126 and accompanying text.
54.
55.
56.

Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995.
Id.
Id.

57. Id.

58. Id.

at 20996.
liability will be
at 20997. It is unclear whether actual involvement is required before

[Vol. 59
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held ins u ffi c ient to make the SBA an owner despite the Mirabiles' ar
gument that these restrictions may have prev nted the redirection f
�
?
funds into cleanup activities. Since the SBA's involvement was only m
the financia l aspects of the company, and not in the management

of

the facility, it was entitled to summary judgment absolving it from
liability. 59
In contrast to ABT and the SBA, Mellon's lending activities were
closely enough entangled with the polluter to present a jury question
regarding Mellon's status as an "owner" or "operator." Of particular
concern to the court was the constant presence of one Mellon loan
officer at the paint c ompany. The officer testified that he became more
involved with the paint company because "his superiors at Mellon
wanted him t o have 'more of a day-to-day hands-on involvement.' "60
More specifically, the officer was to m onitor the cash collateral ac
counts, establish a reporting system between the company and Mellon,

and determine the order in which paint orders would be filled. The
officer also insisted o n additional sales efforts and certain manufactur
ing changes.

While noting that "[t]he reed upon which the Mirabiles

seek to impose liability on Mellon is slender indeed,"61 the court found
that the testimony presented a genuine issue of fact and, thus, denied
Mellon's request for summary judgment.

C. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland at
tempted to clarify the standard in United States

v.

Maryland Bank &

Trust. 62 In Maryland Bank, the o r iginal owners, the McLeods, oper
ated a trash and garbage business o n the site that was eventually la
beled the California Maryland Drum site or "CMD site." The

son

of

the original o wners purchased the property with a loan from Mary
land Bank & Trust (MBT), but s o o n defaulted on the loan payments.

�BT foreclosed

and took title at a foreclosure sale.

Following the

discovery of the hazardous waste a t the site, the EPA requested that
MBT, as a n owner, initiate cleanup activities. The bank refused, so
the agency cleaned up the site itself and filed the action seeking re·

sponse costs from MBT.

MBT argued that the security interest exemption applied.63 The
imposed. It seems probable th a t
.
con tractuaI clauses will be viewed cumulatively
I ender to be an owner see mJra
, r. notes 88-92 and
·

59.

Mirabile,

60.

Id.

.

.

15

61.

Id.

62.

����ti. L.

63.

·

Envtl. L. Rep. at

20997.

accompanying

text.

Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20557 (D. Md.
1986).
LA § IOl(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A (1982
)
).

in

order to

find. the

LENDER LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE

1988]

667

court responded by stating that when MBT purchased the property at
the foreclosure sale, i ts security interest ripened into an investment.

Thus, MBT "purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not to pro

tect its security interest, but to protect its investment."64 The court
distinguished Mirabile based upon the length of time that the secured

party held the property following foreclosure. 6s The court limited the
application of its decision by holding that, "[t]he [security interest]
exclusion does not apply to former mortgagees currently holding title
after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as
here, the former mortgagee has held title for nearly four years, and a
full year before the EPA cleanup. ,, 66 However, the court declined to
discuss the situation where the foreclosing party promptly reassigns
the property.67 This leaves open the possibility that the secured party
may be held liable for merely purchasing the property at the foreclo
sure sale because that is when the "security interest ripens into an
investment."
The court also cited two policy rationales for limiting the applica
bility of the security interest exemption. First, the insulation from lia

bility would give the lender a competitive advantage at the foreclosure
sale. 68 Since all other prospective purchasers would be faced with po
tential CERCLA liability, the lender could purchase the property for a
depressed price, wait for the EPA to clean up the property at taxpayer

expense , and sell the property at a profit. 69

The second policy cited by the court in support of a narrow read
ing of the security interest exemption was that lenders should, and
often do, routinely perform precisely the type of investigation that

would lead to discovery of hazardous waste. 70 Thus, if they are able to
avoi d CERCLA liability, the statute would, in essence, be "an insur
ance sche me" absolving secured lenders "from responsibility for their
mistake in judgments."71
64. Maryland Bank, 16 Envtl.

65. Id. at 20560.
66.

L.

Rep. at 20559.

Id. at 20559.

67.

Id. at 20559 n.5.

68.

Id at 20660.

inappropri·
69. One commentator isolates the flaw inherent in this rationale. "(W)hile it may be
it may be equally inappropri·
at e to grant a lending
expense,
nt's
governme
the
at
n
institutio a windfall
the amount of which greatly
ate to penalize an innocent
lending institution by imposing a liability
SMpra note 7• at 57·58· One
exc eeds the value of
Lockett.
&
riano
the land, even in a pristine state." So
its interest m the c ollateral in
suggest ed solution is
g
forfeitin
between
choose
10
to allow t h e lender
5
which case its potential liability would cease, or keep the property and pay cleanup costs. Id. at 8
n.26. See

infra

notes 164-65 and accompanyin g text.

L. Rep. at 20S60.
.
ying tut.
71. Id. For the problems with this rationale, see supra notes 118-122 and acc ompan
70.

Maryland Bank, 16 Envtl.
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IV. THE EMERGING STANDARD72
While the standard is far from clear, it is possible to glean some
guiding principles from the previously discussed cases. The basic prin
ciple is that for a lender to be liable as an owner under CERCLA, its
involvement must b e in the management of the borrower's facility,

as

opposed to the management of the borrower's financial affairs. The

Mirabile court indicated that "it would appear that before a secured
creditor such as ABT may be liable, it must, at a minimum, participate
in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site. "73
In addition to this general standard, the cases also isolate specific
activities that are likely to s ubject a lender to CERCLA liability. For
example, cJauses, even if not exercised, that allow the lender to ap
prove the borrower's m anagerial appoin t ments, to approve major busi
ness transactions

of the borrower,

or

to provide "management

assistance" to the b orrower may lead to the conclusion that the lender
is an owner.74 In addition, if the lender hires a management consult
ant to assist the borrower i n its affairs or assists in implementing man
ufacturing or

design

CERCLA liability.

changes or reassigning personnel, it risks

I n contrast, purely financial activities such

as

placing caps on dividends and salaries payable to the borrower's of
ficers, reserving the right to approve the p urchase of life insurance for
the borrower's emp loyees, general involvement in the accounting and
records of the borrower, or assisting the borrower with marketing or
sales strategy and tactics in basic activities of the company that do not
specifically involve generation, disposal,

or storage of hazardous

wastes will not typically subject the lender to liability.7 5
Despite these "guiding principles," the standard is very uncer

tain. 76 Indeed, given the complexity of the issue and the varying de

grees and types of participation by banks, it is very difficult to attain a
"bright-line" standard.

However, that should not deter the courts

from attempting to forge a clear standard to aid lenders in avoiding
those activities that will subject them to environmental liability. In

note

72. The text
7, at 41-43.

of this section relies heavily upon the principles enunciated in Berz & Sexton, supra

73. Mirabile, 15

Envtl. L. Rep. at

20996.

74.

Berz & Sexton, supra note

75.

An in depth analysis of these activities merely gives rise to more difficult issues. For example,

7,

at

41-42.

drawing the line between assistance in marketing or sales strategy and assistance in the management of
the facility may be difficult. Similarly, while mere "suggestions" of ways to make the operation should

not subject the lender to liability, it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell when a "suggestion" becomes
"management assistance."

76.

Berz & Sexton, supra note

7,

at

43.

1988]

LENDER LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE

669

this regard, several issues must be resolved before a clear, usable stan
dard becomes a reality.
One of these open issues concerns the application of the standard
where the borrower is engaged solely i n the disposal of hazardous
waste. Indeed, the Mirabile court, in a footnote, indicates that "[i]t
may be that a different test would be appropriate for financers of enti
ties whose sole business is that of hazardous waste disposal. "77 While
this test is not discussed in the case law, it presumably would impose
lender liability based on lesser involvement in the management of the
facility.78
Although the different standard may be justified on the basis of
the higher degree o f risk that the lender can uncover with a cursory
examination, it is arguable that there should be no difference i n the
standard. The disproportionality of liability to the value of the secur
ity interest is present in this situation, just as it is when hazardous
waste is an indirect effect of the productive activity.79 Also, limiting
the available funds 80 to those firms in the disposal industry may be
counterproductive by decreasing competition among disposal compa
nies. 81 The result of decreased competition will be an increase in the
cost of disposal. 8 2 Consequently, to minimize cleanup costs, the se
cu red creditor w h o loans money to a company directly involved in the
waste disposal business should be treated in the same manner as a
secured creditor who loans money to a company who pollutes as an
effect of the manufacturing process.
The second issue that the cases leave unanswered concerns the
77. Mirabile, IS Envtl. L. Rep. at 20996 n.S.
78. This will be the case because the business of the borrower is hazardous waste disposal. Consc ·
quently, by becoming involved in the financial activity of the borrower, the lender is directly involved in
the financial aspects of hazardous waste disposal, rather than merely involved in financial activities of a
business, where one of the effects of that business is the production of hazardous waste.

79. See supra note 66.
80. Th e argument is that

imposing liability will prevent lenders from loaning money to pot entia l

polluters and thus increase the interest rate. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying tut. The etrect
will be pa rt i cul arly acute with respect to firms engaged in the disposal of hazardous waste because the
risks are much more apparent.

81.

Competition may decrease because the high interest rate will act as a barrier to entry. While

the significance of the interest rate cannot be known without statistical analysis, there are two rea.\Ons

to believe that it will be large. First, due to the high level of risk involved, the interest rate is likely to

increase dramaticall y . Second, due to the capital intensive nature of t he waste disposal indust ry . a n

increase in the interest r a t e will dramatically increase start-up costs fo r potential entrants. I n addition,

lending institutions mig ht react to the higher degree of risk by limiting their lending involvement to

those disposal firms with existing reputations and choose not to take a chance on a new en tr ant whom

they perceive

as

more likely to make a costly mistake. For a discussion of barriers to entl')', see gener

ally J. BAIN, PRICE
THEORY

65 (1976).
82. That

)93-95 (1952); J. fflRSHLEIF£R, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 262-

a monopolize d industry will charge a hig her price than a competitive industry is well
d ocumented by
the economic literature. E.g., J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 81. at 274-301.
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?

Mirabile hel that a lender
.
could foreclose and still be protected b y the secunty interest exemp
ability of a lender to foreclose at all. 83

tion. Indeed, the court specifically ruled that ABT's activities follow

�

ing foreclosure, taken to secure the propert� aga nst vandalis� and

�nvolve ment

m the
.
normal day-to-day operation of the site and were msuffic1ent to make

prevent further depreciation, did n o t c onstitute
ABT an owner.84

However, the Maryland Bank court cast doubt on that part of the

Mirabile decision. It stated that the bank took title "not to protect its
security interest, but to protect its investment. "85 The court reasoned
that the security interest exemption applies only to "those persons
who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a
then-held security interest in the land. "86 Consequently, the security
interest "terminated at the foreclosure sale ... at which time it ripened
into full title. "87 A literal reading of this language suggests that the
moment the bank takes title following foreclosure, it becomes an
owner under CERCLA.

The fact that the court expressly refused to

decide whether a prompt reassignment of the foreclosed property
would preserve the security interest exemption leaves the question
open whether foreclosure itself will render the lender an owner, or
whether the analysis is limited to actions following foreclosure. In any
event, liability for foreclosure alone is a risk that lenders will b e forced
to consider in the loan-making process.
•

Even if the act of foreclosing on a previously-polluted site will not

result in CERCLA liability, foreclosing on an active facility may well
lead to liability.88 Where the security interest is in land that houses an
active enterprise, often the best way to preserve its value is to continue
the operation of the facility.89 The lending institution is caught in the
middle: It can force the company to shut down, in which case the
value of the security interest plummets, o r it can continue to operate
the facility.
The decision is equally difficult for the courts.

Quite simply,

there are no specific standards for determining the liability of a lender
who forecloses on polluted property.

The q uestion is whether the

lender took title to protect its security interest or as an investment.
83.

Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 43-44.

84. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20996 ("Regardless of the
nature of the title received by ABT,
its actions with respect to the foreclosure were plainly undertake
n in
security
interest in the property.").

85. Maryland Bank, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20559.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87.

Id.

88.

Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 44.

89. See Soriano & Lockett, supra note 7, at 59.

an effort to protect its
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The answer would seem to hinge upon a determination of the intent of
the foreclosing party. However, given the general expansion of liabil
ity, 90 it seems likely that the exclusion will be construed narrowly and
liability will be imposed in close cases.

Consequently, the secured

creditor foreclosing on an active facility faces a serious risk of CER
CLA liability if it continues management operations.
Finally, although both decisions speak in terms of involvement in
the "day-to-day operations of the facility," it is possible that "even
conditions or restrictions on the borrower's financial affairs generally,
if there are several, may be viewed cumulatively by a court

as

consti

tuting sufficient involvement in the borrower's facility to warrant the
imposition of Superfund liability. . . . "91

Since it is axiomatic that

financial restrictions will have an effect on the operation of the facility,
courts may impose liability where the

effect of

the financial restrictions

on the facility is great enough to constitute involvement in the
facility.92
As a result of these unresolved questions, the standard is very
uncertain. However, given the tenor and approach of most of the re
cent CERCLA cases, it seems likely that courts will expand the situa
tions where a lender will be held liable.93 To determine whether this
e xpansion of liability is a net benefit or net detriment to society, an
economic analysis of the costs and benefits of the legal rule is appropri
ate.

This economic analysis reveals that it is both inefficient and

counter-productive to hold lenders liable unless the evidence clearly
establishes a "joint venture" between the lender and borrower.

V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. Economics as a Paradigm
Perhaps the most appropriate paradigm to isolate the effects of a
legal rule that holds lenders liable for the p olluting activities of a bor
rower is economics. Although economic analysis is useful in a broad
rang e of situations,94 it seems particularly appropriate in the present

matter because of the obvious impact on businesses.

Economics measures the societal value of a legal rule by measur90. See su pra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 43.
This would essentially affirm the argument made by the EPA in In rr T.P. Long Chem., Inc
45 Ba nkr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), that by placing financial restrictions on the borrower, the
lender has a significant effect on the actual management of the facility and should be held liable. Stt id
91.

92.

.•

at 288.

93. See supra notes 30 - 38 and accompanying text.

For a good explanation of the benefits and limitation! of economic analysis. stt R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 22-26 (3rd ed. 1986). For a view that economicl may not be appropn94.
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ing its relative efficiency.95 The concept o f efficiency,

as

utilized in this

Comment, means providing goods, services and intangible items in
amounts that maximize aggregate social welfare. 96 Since consumers
are willing to pay a price for goods and services produced by polluting
firms, the availability of these items obviously increases efficiency.
However, consumers are also willing to .. pay a price" to reduce pollu
tion. 97 The consequence is that the social cost of pollution must be
included in the policy analysis in order to get an accurate measure of
aggregate social welfare.
The tool that economics uses to find this efficient level of produc
tion is marginalist analysis. 98 "Analyzing at the margin" requires ex
amining the cost and benefit of each additional unit of production.99 If
the "marginal benefit" of a given unit is greater than the "marginal
cost," production of that unit will result in a net increase in social
welfare.

Consequently, the unit should be produced. Conversely, if

the marginal benefit is less than the marginal cost, production of the
given unit results in a net decrease in social welfare. Thus, the unit
should not be produced.

Similar analysis of each unit leads to the

result that the efficient output is reached where the marginal benefit
just equals the marginal cost.
Marginalist analysis indicates that the efficient level of production
will be reached as a profit motivated firm makes decisions to maximize
profit.

The assumption is that the individual firm will calculate and

consider all relevant costs.

However, pollution imposes serious costs

on society that are not considered by the firm. 100 In other words, the
production of the goods and services in question produces external
ate to the study of law, see Leif, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominolism, 60 VA.

L. R E V . 45 1 ( 1974), and J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 255-75 ( 1984).
95.

R. POSNER, supra note 94, at 1 3· 1 4.

96.

See id. at 12. Thus, "efficiency" is a function of both the goods and services produced by the

polluting manufacturer and the amount of hazardous waste it generates. See also A. FELDMAN, WEL·
FARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 3 (1 980) (defining efficiency as a "pareto optimum"

- a situation where there is no alternative available that would make some people better offand no one
worse off). For a list and explanation of some of the most popular notions of efficiency, see Coleman,
Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 5 1 2-20 (1980).
97.

L.
Harrison & Rubinfeld, Bedonie Housing Prices and the Demand for Cleon Air, 5 J. ENVT

ECON. & MGMT. 63 ( 1 978).

98.

For a good exposition o f marginalist analysis, see R. RUFFIN & P. GREGOR Y, PRINCIPLES OF

ECONOMICS 5 ( 1 983).

99. For a recent exposition rejecting
cost-benefit analysis in this context see Sheehan, Econom·
ism, Democracy and Hazardous Wastes:
Some Policy Considerations in CONTR VERSIES IN ENVIRON
M ENTAL POLICY I08 (S. Kamien icki,
R. O'Brien & M. Clarke eds. 1 986).
lOO. Certainly some firms will "consider"
the societal costs of pollution but the assumption that
firms are motivated solely by p fit
ts reasonable and a few vanants from this assumption w1·11 not aIt er
ro
the analysis. See R. POSNE R, supra
note 94, at 1 5 - 1 7.

�

·

·

.

'

·
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costs that are not a part of the firm's decision-making process. I n eco
101
nomic terms, pollution is the classic example of an "externality. "
The appropriate solution to an extemality problem is to force the
firms to include the external cost in their internal production deci
sions. 102 This process, often called "internalization," may be accom
plished by a legal rule. Indeed, the CERCLA policy of imposing
liability upon those who benefit from the activity is arguably a form of
1
internalization. 03 By requiring the polluting company to pay re
sponse and cleanup costs, the business is forced to pay for the external
cost of pollution.
The result of the internalization process is a reduction in produc
tive output. 104 The legal rule imposing liability on polluting businesses
101. E.g., E. BROWNING & ]. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 32 (1 979);
A. FELDMAN, supra note 96, at 9 1 .

102. G . CALABRESI, THE Cos TS O F ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS

2 1 2 (4th

ed. 1975). Posner takes the view that "internalization" is not always the most efficient solution. Essen
tially, the application of his argument to environmental liability is that it may be cheaper to have the
lender or consumers bear the costs of cleanup. It will be argued subsequently that the polluter itself is
the least-cost avoider of pollution. Consequently, the polluter should bear the burden. Stt R. POSNER,

supra note 94, at 54.
103. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical .t Chem. Co., S79 F. Supp. 823, 838
(W.D. Mo. 1984),

ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d

726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.

denied,

108 S. Ct. 146

( 1 987).

104. A simple graph

illustrates this principle.

$IQ

D

MR
Assume a polluting business with some market power.

Consequently, the flnn demand curve (0)

slopes downward with the marginal revenue curve (MR) placed somewhere to 1he left. Costs. absent
internalization, are represen ted by ATC and MC, with ATC standing for the averaae total cost curve,

a nd MC standing for the marginal cost curve. As we are taught in an y intermediate economics class,
the efficient level of production is found where MR "'" MC, or at output Q.

A law forcing int ernal iza tion of external costs, such

as

CERCLA. has the eft'ect of i ncreasi ng the
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As costs increase, the gap between

marginal benefit and marginal cost decreases and the efficient level of
output gets smaller. If a certain activity is producing unaccounted-for
external costs, society demands that the activity be reduced. Conse
quently, the internalization of external costs is merely a method of
using the firm's profit-making decisions to reach the efficient result.
As output is reduced, t h e result will likely include some firms going
out of business.

As internalization increases the cost of doing busi

ness, many firms will find it unprofitable to continue operating. If the
expected liability increases expected costs enough, the firm would be
105

better off to cease operations and go out of business.

This conclusion rests upon an assumption that the market is bet
ter able to "find" the efficient level than is government regulation. If
information were perfect and costless, the government could imple
ment and enforce regulations without costs, and the outcomes would
be precisely the same. 1 06 However, neither of these propositions is
true.

Information

is

o ften

unattainable.

Consumers' wants and

desires are often based upon unarticulable or even unknown factors.
107

The additional "costs" of government errors are well documented.

Thus, the best that the government can hope to do is to approximate
108 and force the in·
the societal costs associated with hazardous waste
ternalization of those costs through a legal rule.
While the above analysis reveals that the polluting firms should
be held liable to force internalization of the external costs of pollution,
costs of production to the firm. Graphically, this has the elfect of increasing average total costs from
ATC to ATC, and shifting marginal costs from MC to MC,. The efficient level is where MR = MC,,
or output Q , . The resulting output is lower than in the absence of internalization, at a higher price.
This graph may be found in any price-theory text book. E.g. , J. H I RSHLEIFER, supra note 8 1 , at
274-78.

The result may also be reached using mathematics.

See J . HENDERSON & R. QUANDT.

MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 42-55 ( 1 958). For a simpler exposition

.

see A. FELDMAN, supra note 96, at 89- 105.

105.

These industries have some social value or they would be driven out of business. See F.M.

Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 1 3- 1 4 (2d ed. 1 980). While the costs
of cleanu p probably will force many of these firms out of business, some may bear the cost and remain
viable. Thus, a complete elimination of productive output is inefficient.
106.

If information were perfect, the government would set production at Q, the efficient level.

However, it seems indisputable that information is not perfect.

It is for this reason that we say

a

voluntary exchange or market is more efficient than heavy regulation . R. POSNER, supra note 94, at 14.
Indeed, much of the current debate in the environmental literature revolves around the use of a price
mechanism in pollution control. See, e.g. , Schelling, Preface to INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION ix-xix (T. Schelling ed. 1 983).
I 07

·

See Drucker, The Sickness of Government, Pue. INTEREST 3, 13 (Winter 1969).

108.

The best approximation will probably be the cost of cleanup. However, this is an "approxi·
.
matton" rather than a true measure because societal costs may be greater than the cost of cleanup.
That is, consumers may wish to have the products associated with the hazardous waste production
rather than forcing an elimination or decrease in the amount of available products. This possibility
should be ignored since Congress has made a judgment to clean up the hazardous waste sites.

1 988]

LENDER LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE

675

the analysis does not, thus far, justify imposing liability on lenders.
Lender liability will be efficient if the benefits of additional deterrence
and additional funds for cleanup outweigh the additional costs. These
costs and benefits must include the effect that the rule will have on the
future behavior of parties.

1 09

It can be argued that Congress has eliminated any such prospec
tive effect of the rule by focusing on the cleanup at existing hazardous
waste sites.

1 10

The argument is that the Congress's concern was with

the current cleanup and not with influencing future behavior. This
argument is not p e rsuasive. First, although cleanup and deterrence
are distinct concepts, they are quite clearly related. Thus, a costly
cleanup remedy will clearly influence the way that parties in the future
behave. Consequently, any analysis of such a sweeping rule which ig
nores its effects on parties' future behavior is inadequate.

Second,

Congressional intent concerning who should pay the cost of cleanup
evinces some level o f concern regarding the prospective effects of the
rule. Congress has made a judgment that

all hazardous waste sites,

now and in the future, should be cleaned up.
Furthermore, Superfund provides that those who benefit from
p olluting activity should pay the cost of cleanup.

111

Despite this gen

eral p roposition, the q uestion of who, in fact, benefits from the activity
is left for the courts.

Specifically, the question of whether a lender

"benefits" to the level required is left unanswered by the statute.

1 12

In

other words, Congress left the question of determining the allocation
of cleanup costs to the courts. Indeed, the security interest exemption
seems to represent a congressional judgment that the costs associated
with lender liability are too great absent some special circum
stan ces.1 1 3 Consequently, to resolve the questions left open by the

statute, and app r o p riately allocate the costs of cleanup, the courts
should consider the prospective benefits and costs of a legal rule im
posing liability on lenders.
B. The

Cost Benefit Analysis

W hile economic theory reveals that forcing polluting enterprises
to internalize external costs promotes efficiency, the question remains
w hether a rule forcing lending institutions to do the same thing leads
109.
1 10.
1 1 1.
1 1 2.

R. POSNER, supra note 94, at 18-19.
See United States v . Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1068-79 (D. Colo. 1985).
See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst ) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1 9 85).
.

The only relevant legislative history reveals that the security interest exemption was intended
to apply to persons holding title merely to secure a loan. See H.R. REP. No. 10 16, pt. II, 96th Cong.,

2d Sess. JS ( 1980).
1 1 3. See Berz & Sexton, supro note 7, at 37.
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us closer to the desired result. This Comment argues that it does not
aid in leading us to the efficient result and, in all likelihood, will be a
detriment.
The benefits of imposing liability on lenders are clear. The lend
ing institution can certainly provide a "deep pocket" from which to

pay the cost of cleanup. 1 1 4 This imposition o f liability will not only
aid the cleanup of the particular site in question, but can also provide
funds for future cleanups since the lender cleanup payments will help
replenish the moneys i n Superfund.

115

The imposition o f lender liability also has deterrence benefits.
Lenders will be reluctant to loan money to potential polluters unless
they can contractually limit their responsibility for pollution. As the
availability of funds to p olluting businesses becomes more scarce, the
output of the industry will decrease and, as a result, so will pollution.
However, this efficient result can be reached more directly by impos
ing liability upon the

polluting industry.

That is, liability on lenders

and on polluters may be substitutes for one another. However, they
are not necessarily complementary policies. That is, the key question
is w hether imposing liability on lenders

in addition to

polluting indus

tries is more efficient than limiting liability to polluting firms. This
Comment argues that imposing liability on lenders, in addition to lia
bility on the industry, will impose significant costs on the industry and
cause it to reduce output below the efficient level. These costs may be
conveniently, though perhaps artificially, divided into three categories:
costs to the lender, costs to the borrower, and costs to third parties.

1 16

1 . Costs to the Lender
The most obvious cost imposed upon the lender is the direct cost
of cleaning up the hazardous waste. As discussed previously, these
costs are often disproportionate to the value of the security interest or
even the loan itself. 1 1 7 As a result, the lender must somehow pay for
the liability associated with the hazardous waste.

Presumably, this

payment will come out of the profits of the lending institution or from
a contingency fund. Given the generally unstable condition of many
1 1 4.

Soriano & Lockett, supra note 7, at 58 n.29.

The "fund" is now supplied by a tax on chemical
companies.
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1986).
1 1 5.

H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962,

1 16. This division is artificial since costs
imposed on the lender will inevitably have an impact on
the borrower and consumer through higher
interest rates. Similarly, a cost imposed on the borrower
will affect the lender through a lower demand
for capital and the consumer through less available
products. Nevertheless, the division is
useful for analytical purposes.
1 1 7.

See supra note 69.
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8
banks today ' 1 and the large liability costs associated with CERCLA,
lender liability may have a significant negative impact by increasing
the risk of bank failures.
Another way to view this objection is in terms of insurance.
Lenders subject to potential liability may become, in essence, insurers;
they offer a loan to a firm at a slightly higher than competitive

rate in

exchange for assuming liability for cleanup costs. The difference be
tween the competitive rate and the rate offered

can

be considered an

insurance premium.
In addition to the direct costs of liability, the lender will also in
cur many costs as it attempts to avoid liability in its role as an insurer.
Lenders, as a class, are inefficient insurers. Although the

Maryland

Bank court asserted that "[f]inancial institutions are in a position to
investigate and discover potential problems in their secured proper
ties," and that "such research is routine," the court offers no support

for this proposition. 1 1 9 At least one commentator disagrees with this
assessment, arguing that the requisite specialized, technical compe
tence is rarely held among lending institutions. 1 20 Consequently, lend
ers

must expend

competence, as well

time and resources
as

evaluating the tests. 1 2 1
The direct costs

to acquire the necessary

the direct cost associated with perfonning and

of testing are likely to be quite large. Estimates
$2,000 to $3,000 for a "red ftag" test to $12,000

of the cost range from
to

$20,000 when waste contamination is involved. 1 22 Furthermore,

even when a hazardous waste site is identified, the costs do not end.
Before a case actually goes to trial, both the government and the po
tentially responsible party spend months or even years perfonning in
dependent tests to determine the
3
environmental harm . 1 2
1 1 8.

existence, scope, and cause of the

78 banks failed in 1984. Projitab/ility of Jnsurtd Comm�rcia/ Banks in 1984, 71 FED. RE·

BULL 836, 836 (Nov. 1985). 1 18 failed in 1985. Profitability of U.S. -Cltantrtd ltUMrtd Com·
mercia/ Banks in 1 985, 72 FE D. RESERVE BULL. 6 1 8 (Sept. 1 986). Both of these numbers weft
Sl'.RVE

records.

1 1 9. United States v. Maryland Bank &: Trust Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,57,
205 60 (D. Md. 1986).
120. Set Pfeiler, Construction Lending and Products Liability, 2' Bus. I.Aw. 1309, 1 324 ( 1 970)
(di scuss ing lender liability for defective residential construction).
have forced lenden to
1 2 1 . It could be
cases discusaed earlier in this Comment

argued that the
develop the necessary
it may now be cf&cient
expertise. Given that �ult. the coats have been aunk and
for them to conduct the necessary testing. However, this argument is not perauaaive. First. u argued
below, the variable costs will also tend to be quite large. Second. the mere flci that they have the

expertise docs not justify the expenses to maintain it or additional liability. Stt T•IF· TOJtit: Was1'
Sius hoH Bank Liability H«idacht, The Denver POii, Aug. 1 6, 1987, at 0 1 , col. 4.
122. Id.

123. Pfeiler, supra note 1 20, at 13 14.
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It could be arg u ed t hat the m ere existence of hazardous waste
s hould be enough to d et er banks from l ending money. However, if the
t ests are merely a litmus test or a red flag for t he existence of hazard
ous waste, the lend er may deny funds to many businesses that could
r emain viable despite t he added cleanup costs. 1 24 The result is that
output is decreased below t he efficient level as potentially viable busi
n esses fail due to t h e excessively hig h cost of borrowed funds.
The better view i s t hat actions taken by a financial institution to
guarantee a valuable s ecurity interest, suc h as environmental testing,
should not, in and o f themselves, expose t he institution to potential
liability. Even if t he l ender does routinely p erform some form of tests,
these s hould not b e viewed as the equivalent o f tests taken pursuant to
a duty owed to a third party. 125 Positive test results will reduce the
expected profit of a loan as both the borrower's ability to pay and the
value of the s ecurity interest in case of d efault are reduced. 126 The
cost of funds to t h e borrower increases and output will be reduced.
T h e result is efficient because the availability of funds will reflect the
borrower's ability to pay, w hich, in tum, r eflects the societal cost of
pollution. 1 27 In contrast, direct liability on t he lender forces a reduc
tion in loanable funds that i s unrelated to actual market conditions, as
d efined by the borrow er's ability to pay.
In addition to th e costs associated with testing, lender liability
may force the financial institution into a no-win situation. Recent ex
pansion of lender liability outside of t he environmental context seems
to indicate that a bank may be held liable for not intervening to force
changes in the business d ecisions of t h e b orrower. 1 28 Ironically, the
l ender may be liable for failing to take the very actions that, if affirma

tively taken, would subj ect it to CERCLA liability. The only clear
effect of these conflicting t heories is t hat t h e loan becomes less profita
b l e to the lender and l ess funds are availabl e to the borrower.

The above mentione d costs will decrease the profits of the lending
institution , either t hrou g h direct expense o r lost business as the l end
ers either balk at potential liability or raise their rules to protect them

s el v es against heightened exposure. Thus, the l egal rule imposes the
cost arbitrarily on parti es who benefit only p eripherally. If the lender
l 24. If the financial institution refuses to lend
every time test results show existence of hazardous
waste, it will refuse funds to many businesses
which could absorb the costs of cleanup and continue
operation.
125.
126.

See Pfeiler, supra note 1 20.

See infra notes 129-34 and accompanyin
g text.
127· This conclusion assumes that the cost of
pollution is internalized due to the CERCLA liabil.
ity scheme. See supra notes 100 103 and accompanying text.
1 28. E.g. State Nat'I Bank v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); see also
Swartz, Lender Liability, U.S. BANK
ER 10 (May 1 986).
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is unable to pass on the costs associated with liability and potential
liability, then the shareholders of the lender will be forced to bear
them.

Imposing these costs on lenders should be contrasted with impos

ing the costs on the polluter itself. Since the polluting enterprise re
ceives profits directly from the polluting activity, forcing them to pay
for testing and cleanup costs is consistent with internalization. That
is, these costs are appropriately regarded as a cost of doing business.
In contrast, the lender benefits only indirectly. Indeed, if the policy of
forcing those who benefit to pay the costs is extended to hold lenders
liable, the logical result is that suppliers of materials used in the pollut
ing production process should be held liable along with lenders since
the lender is nothing more than a supplier of funds.
2. Costs t o the Borrower
It is clear that some costs must be imposed on the borrower in
order to force the firm to the efficient level of production. More specif
ically, the firm must internalize the cost of pollution. Once the inter
nalization is completed, the natural and efficient result is a reduction
in available funds. 1 29 The reasons are relatively straightforward. A
lender' s decision to lend money is based on at least three variables. ' 30
The probability of a loan is positively related to the borrower's ability
to repay the loan and the value of the security interest in

case

of a

default. That same probability ·is negatively related to the administra
tive costs associated with the loan. 1 3 1 Given this framework, it is easy
to see why efficiency results in the restriction of available funds.

Potential CERCLA liability will affect two of the three variables.
The borrower's ability to repay is adversely affected. The liability re

stricts the firm's profits and internal funds, thus making the default
more probable. Similarly, CERCLA liability reduces the value of the
sec u rity interest.

In other words, a piece of land is worth more with

out hazardous wastes than it is when pollution is present. Thus, the
internalization process inevitably leads to a reduction in the supply of
funds to borrowers because of risk of lending to a polluting enterprise.
When t h e lender considers the potential liability of the borrower
to pay and 'he value or rhe secur·
1
Si
nce r<Hcntial l iabilit y wil l decrease 1he borrower's ability
29.
.
1 1 Y i n t e rest. !he
dei:re;i�.
lender will not be as willing to loan and the fonds available to the mduMry will
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as it affects the return on the loan, the resulting constriction in the
supply of funds poses no costs, except those costs which appropriately
reflect market conditions. 1 32 In contrast , imposing lender liability

reduces the supply o f funds beyond the efficient level and poses the
risk of undesirable behavior. The lender still considers potential bor
rower liability since a t the inception of a loan agreement the borrower

However, in addition to borrower liability, the
lender must also assess his own potential liability. In tenns of the
variables isolated above, the lender's potential liability further reduces
may be held liable.

t h e value of the already depressed security interest. As a result, the
expected value of the security interest will often be negative. 133 That

is, the existence of a security interest may actually constitute a liability
as the lender ponders the decision of whether or not to loan. Further
more, as argued above, the administrative costs associated with the
loan are likely to be high. 1 34 The economic result is that funds are
r estricted beyond the efficient level, and, consequently, the output level
is below the efficient l e vel
Under these circumstances, the lender may be willing to loan
This may be illustrated by a graph.

132.

s

j PL+LL

QPL+LL

QPL

Q

Q

The graph shows the classic supply and demand
diagram for loanable funds. Given the demand
for loanable funds, the effect of different liability
rules is seen as a s hift leftward in the supply of funds. S
represents the supply of funds where there is
no threat of either polluter or lender liability. SPL illus
trates that the supply of funds decreases, or
shifts left, as liability is imposed on the polluter only. As
argued above, this is efficient since it forces
the polluter to pay for the cost of cleanup and internalize
the external costs of polluti on. s.ee su
pra notes 98-108 and accompanying text. However, imposing
I"tab.ihty
.
on the lender, as well as the polluter,
further restricts the supply of funds. This is graphically
represented by S •t + LL· The resuIt ·ts
a h"1gher interest
·
rate and a lower quantity of funds. In other
words, the imposition of lender liability
shifts the supply of funds too far leading to an inefficient result.
'
.
1 3 3 This wi·u be the case where the
dollar amount of the liability is very large and the probability
of habthty 1s
. relatively high.
·

·

.

.

.

1 34.

See supra notes 1 1 7-126 and accom
panying text.

·
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funds, but only at a higher rate of interest. A higher rate of interest
will, among other things, adversely affect innovation with respect to
pollution-reducing technology. Enterprises attempting to maximize
profits have strong incentives to develop cost-reducing production
techniques. 135 Since CERCLA forces the internalization of the cost of
pollution, firms will have a greater incentive to develop pollution re
duction techniques . 1 36 The higher rate of interest makes innovation
more difficult. Research is not a free activity, and the availability of
funds is often a key variable influencing the level of research and de
velopment. 137 Although the results are difficult to quantify, the resul
tant reduction in innovative activities may render lender liability
counterproductive i n the long term . 13 8
Finally, the clearest result of holding lenders liable is an increase
in the number of bankruptcies. 139 While efficiency demands that some
firms exit the industry, lender liability deters lending institutions from
taking actions to aid potentially viable enterprises. In fact, banks may
force borrowers into bankruptcy rather than risk CERCLA liabil
ity. 140 The actions that lenders typically take to aid a faltering firm
(e. g., appointing a management consultant or suggesting management
changes) are precisely those sorts of activities that make CERCLA
liability more likely.

Thus, lenders will be less willing to help, and

firm failures will increase as a result.
Imposing CERCLA liability on lenders also severely affects the
borrower because banks are reluctant to give management assistance
even to successful firms. The result is that the firms are less efficient,
even though they remain in business. While some of these effects are
attributable to the internalization process, many of the impacts go well
beyond those costs associated with the movement to efficiency. Conse135.

A cost reducing technique will lower the cost curve and increase the rectangle of profits. Stt

J. HtRSHLEIFER, supra note 8 1 , at 276.
1 36. This incentive will exist whenever the expected cost of cleanup is greater than the cost of
pollution prevention.
1 37. See F.M. SCHERER, supra note 105, at 41 5-4 1 8; J. ScHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SoctALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 10 I (3d ed. 1 950); and Schwartz & Kamien, Self Financing of an R & D Project, 68
AM . EcON. REV. 252-61 ( 1 978).

1 38. It should be noted that there is an effect which may counteract the negative effect on innova·
tion . The higher interest rates may raise the gains from innovation and create an incentive to undertake
research activities. The problem with this argument is that direct lender liability increases the interest
rate beyond the efficient level. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text. Thus. assuming that

the relevant industry is competitive, the incentive to undertake research is already appropriate, but
funds must still be available to conduct these activities.
1 39. See generally Drabkin, Monnan, &. Kirsch, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous
Belly Up Down n rhe
Waste: Caveat Creditor,
1 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 1 0 1 68 ( 1 985); Note,
Dumps: Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. R EV 1037 ( 1 985); and Baird &

.

Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Waste in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. R EV . 1 199 (1984).
140.

Soriano & Lockett, supra note 7, at 59.

'.
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quently, costs are l arge when compared to the corresponding benefit
and should be avoided. 14 1
3.

Costs to Third Parties

All of the costs discussed above will have some impact on third
parties. For example, an increase in the number of bankruptcies will
adversely affect other creditors who will receive only a portion of the
debt owed them. Similarly, consumers will suffer from fewer product
choices because firms will exit from the industry.
Perhaps the most significant cost imposed on third parties is that
lenders will have to pass on their costs associated with potential CER
CLA liability.

If the bank is able to, it will pass on any additional

costs incurred to consumers of its services, rather than to its share
holders. 142 The issue is the extent to which costs are passed to compa
In the absence of price discrimination,
the lender will have a "pass on" mechanism built in. 1 43 All customers
nies other than the polluter.

will be forced to pay the higher interest rate, not just those who pol
lute. Even if the lender is able to engage in price discrimination and
charge different rates and conditions to different borrowers, limits of
that process suggest that the cost will be i mposed on some innocent
parties. 144 The lender will limit funds to all potential polluters, which
1 s
means that they will limit funds to some innocent businesses. 4
VI. THE PROPOSED STANDARD
Courts should be reluctant to impose liability on the lender who
only acts as the supplier of funds. At the same time, a lender who
engages in a joint venture with a business will directly receive benefits
from the polluting activity and should not be able to avoid liability
merely because of its status as a lending institution. Consequently, the
standard is simply stated. A

court should hold a lender liable as an

1 4 1 . These costs take the form of increased firm failures.

Since these firms could be successful

despite internalizing the costs, the failures of the firm are an inefficient cost. The benefit is minimal
because the costs are already i nternalized to the polluting firm.

142. The issue is the extent to which costs are passed on to companies other than the polluters.
The degree of "pass on" will depend upon the elasticity of demand for funds. See generally, J. HIRSH·

LEIFER, supra note 81, at 1 1 7-23. It would be ideal to have some estimates of elasticities under various
assumptions, but such

.

an

empirical study is well beyond the scope of this paper.

143.

See J. HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note 8 1 , at 290-96.

144.

Id.

1 4 5.

It should be noted that a certain degree of
the increased cost of funds will be

passed on to

':":ent p�rties even if liability is limited to the polluter. However, the argument here is that the
add1tt�nal mterest cost associated with lender liability
will also be passed on to innocent parties. The
mn

result 1s that efficient activities will be deterred.
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owner under CER CLA only when there is clear evidence ofa joint ven
ture between the polluter and the lender.
The joint venture is a device utilized by courts to impose certain
legal consequences due to the nature of the relationship between two
or more parties. 1 4 6 A j oint venture has been defined as "an association
of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for
profit, for which purpose they combine their property, money, efforts,
skill and knowledge. " 147 The existence or nonexistence of a joint ven
ture is a question o f fact, but what constitutes a joint venture is a ques
tion of law. 14 8 Most authorities agree that four elements must be
present to find a j oint venture. These elements are:
"(a) Agreement (express or inferred);
(b) Joint interest (contribution);

(c)

Sharing profits (and usually losses . . . .);

(d) Mutual right to control. " 1 49

The first element illustrates that the essence of a joint venture is a
contract and that the intent of the parties is controlling. This intent is
to be gleaned from the conduct, surrounding circumstances and the
transactions between the parties. 1 50 The second element requires that
there be some j oint interest in the money, skill or services contrib
uted. 1 5 1 The third element requires that "some sharing of profits or
other gain in the achievement of the venture and some apportionment
of the risks involved must be found." 1 5 2 Although most cases require
a sharing of a loss, others ignore this requirement. 1 53 The fourth ele
ment requires an equal right, express or implied, to exercise some con
trol over the conduct of each other. 1 54
The joint venture standard applies to the lender/borrower rela
tionship. m The case of First National Bank v. Haley, 1 56 illustrates
this application. In Haley, the First National Bank of Maryland ("the
Bank") loaned money to the defendant partnership. The loan was evi
denced by a promissory note. When the defendant failed to pay, the
Bank sued for default. Applying the elements of a joint venture, the
146. Taubman, What Constitutes

a

147. Id.

1 48. Grand Isle Campsites, Inc.

v.

Joint Venture, 4 1 CORNELL L.Q. 640 ( 1956).
Check, 262 La. 6, 23, 262 So. 2d 3.50, JS7 ( 1 972).

1 49. H. HENN & J. ALEXAN DER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 1 06 (Jd ed. 1983).
ISO. P & M Cattle Co.

v.

Holler, 559 P.2d 1 0 1 9, 1022 (Wyo. 1 977).

1 5 1 . Taubman, supra note 146, at 644.
1 52. George W. Haxton & Son, Inc. v. Rich, 267 App. Div. 492, 49S, 47 N.Y.S. 2d SO I . 504
( 1 944).
1 5 3. Usdan v. Rosenblatt, 9 3 N. Y.S.2d 862, 863 ( Sup. Ct. 1 949).
1 5 4. Griffin v. Clark. 55 Idaho 3 64, 375, 42 P.2d 297, 302 ( 1935).
1 5 S. See, e.g. , Guilford Mortgage Co. v. Cunningham Brick Co. , 331 F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1%4).

1 56. No. 86 C 29S I (N.D. 111. Dec. I, 1 986).
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defendant argued that the provision in the note that provided that pay
ments were to fluctuate with the borrower's n e t income showed that
the parties intended a joint venture. The defendant further argued
that the Bank's loan was actually "seed money" and satisfied the con
The defe ndant argued that the Bank main

tribution requirement.

tained the requisite control over the joint e nterprise by virtue of
certain covenants of the borrower in the document. Finally, by basing
repayment on the borrower's net income, the defendant argued that
the Bank was sharing in the profits and losses.

The court, however,

was not persuaded. The court indicated that
[t]here is no control by Bank over the expenditure of the $250,000
loan.

Bank has no control under the Note over the operations of

the Partnership (the Borrower' s covenants are simply the standard
loan covenants for the maintenance of the integrity of the property
throughout the loan term).

There is n o provision explicitly related

to the sharing of profits and losses, and finally there is no express
manifestation of the Bank's intent to be associated with the Part
nership as a joint

nt ure . 1 5 7

ve

Thus, the court found that the relationship did not constitute a joint
venture and the Bank was enti tled to repayment.

Haley illustrates that the typical relationship between a borrower

and a lender will not create a joint venture. More specifically, the fact

that a lender assists a borrower in obtaining m o ney to pay off his

loan, 1 58 approves production plans, 1 59 or inspects the final product 1 60
will not create a joint venture.

Interest is merely the amount paid for

the use of borrowed money, not a share of the borrower's profits.1 61
The application of

the

joint venture standard to determine

whether a financial institution is an "owner" under CERCLA is eco
nomically sound. First, the standard helps solve the uncertainty prob
lem.

Even though the determination of a joint venture is a factual

determination , the standard is more certain due to the existing body of
explanatory law. Second, the standard makes it clear that the typical

clauses in loan agreements (e . g . , requiring approval of plans) will not
subject an institution to CERCLA liability.

The same is true of ac

tions taken to preserve the profitability of the borrower or the value of
the security interest. Under the joint venture standard , the lender will
1 57.

Id.

George D. Homing, Inc. v. McAleenan, 149 F.2d 561, 5 6 6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
761 ( 1 945).
158.

1 59.

Gainsville Carpet Mart v. First Fed. Save & Loan Ass'n, 1 2 1 Ga. App 450, 453, 174 S.E.2d
.

230, 233 ( 1 9 7 0).
160.
161.

Id

Id at 453-54, 1 74 S.E.2d at 2 3 3 .
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face the risk of liability only when it has placed itself in a position to
directly share in the gain of the enterprise. This is the efficient result
since the financial entity has essentially become the polluting entity.
The standard is also consistent with the CERCLA policy of i mposing
l iability on those who benefit.
Two problems remain notwithstanding the wisdom of the joint
venture standard. The first of these problems deals with the effect that
a test that shows hazardous waste will have on lender liability. As
argued above, the mere fact that a financial institution perfonns tests
1 2
should not create a duty to third persons, even under CERCLA. 6
However, it can be argued that if a lender chooses to test and that test
shows the existence of hazardous waste, then the financial entity that
subsequently loans money is fully aware of the risk and should be re
garded as an owner under CERCLA.

Although this argument is

somewhat persuasive, it does not lead to the result that a lender should
be liable every time the tests show a hazardous waste site. Indeed, it
was argued previously that some businesses will continue to operate in
spite of the internalization. Furthermore, the restriction of funds lent
to potential polluters may decrease innovation that would decrease de
velopment of pollution reduction technology.1 63 As a result, it is inef
ficient to impose l iability merely because of tests performed by the
lender.
Positive test results will still serve an important part in the joint
venture analysis. Knowledge of the existence of hazardous waste will
serve as importan t evidence in finding the intent to enter into the req
u isite agreement. However, this knowledge will not be dispositive.
Rat her, the lender's knowledge should be one of the surrounding facts
and circumstances that the court will examine to find an agreement.
The second problem that the joint venture does not solve is that
of the foreclosing lender who then takes the property at a foreclosure
sale. 1 64 The joint venture standard would allow a lender to take title
to the property, hold it while the government pays the cleanup costs,
and then sell it for an unearned profit. Consequently, the joint venture
standard must be amended. One commentator suggests that once the
lender takes the property and the government decides that cleanup is
necessary, the lender should have a choice of retaining title and paying
clean up costs or avoiding liability and abandoning the pro pe rt y. 1 65

162. See supra

notes

1 1 7- 1 25 and accompanying te:u.

1 63. See supra notes 1 33- 1 38 and accompanying text.
164. See 1upra

notes

68-69 and accompanying text.

165. Soriano & Lockett, supra note 7, at S7-58.
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This solution avoids the possible windfall, but limits the lender's liabil
ity to the value of lost profits on the loan.
It should be noted that potential liability will still enter the
lender's calculation. However, the lender considers the potential lia
bility of the borrower only as it affects the value of the security interest
and the ability o f the borrower to repay the loan. As argued previ
ously, this is the efficient result because it internalizes the external
costs of pollutio n .

1 66

This amended joint venture standard isolates the type of activity
that a lender can take without risking CERCLA liability. Assuming
that there was n o joint venture at the time of the loan, the lender may
take actions to preserve the profitability of the borrower, such as mak
ing management-type decisions or sending advisors to help the busi
ness.

Furthermore, the lender may take title to the property and

preserve the value of the security interest in any way the financial in
stitution sees fit.

If that preservation takes the form of continuing op

erations, those activities will not subject the lender to CERCLA
liability. Rather, the lender's decision will be to continue the opera
tion and pay cleanup costs or cease operations altogether and absorb
the loss on the loan.
VII. CONCLUSION
The conflict

between economic

and environmental policy is

brought into sharp focus by recent decisions that impose liability on a
lender as an owner or operator under CERCLA. Although it is clear
that some costs must be i mposed in order to accomplish the cleanup,
imposing liability o n lenders is too cost l y i n c omparison with the bene
fits received. Specifically, the efficient level of production is reached by
holding the polluting firm liable, and h olding the lender liable

as

well

is both unnecessary and costly. Consequently, the courts should only
hold the lender liable where it is clear t h at it has accepted the risk by
entering into a joint venture with the polluter. In this manner, we can
reach the efficient level of production a t minimum cost.

John M Church

1 66. See supra notes 1 29- 1
34 and accompanying text.

